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Abstract
Transnational labor standards are modeled as cooperative solutions to the class
of strategic dilemmas known as Stag Hunts, in which all actors would gain from
a cooperative solution, but only if all cooperate. If you think a partner will defect,
your best strategy is also to defect. Intuitively, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh
will all be better off if none of their children work and all go to school; however
if one defects from this agreement it will capture a stream of foreign investment
linked to child labor. Understanding Stag Hunts explains why transnational la-
bor standards are found both in genuinely international instruments (such as ILO
conventions) and in bilateral trade agreements (since small groups can reach co-
operative solutions in experimental Stag Hunts, while large groups cannot), and
why multilateral standards are better than unilateral U.S. standards (because de-
fection from a Stag Hunt makes rivals’ defection rational). The Stag Hunt model
sharpens the inquiry, but does not resolve, the question of the appropriate role of
sanctions in the enforcement of labor standards.
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A Stag Hunt Account and Defense of Transnational Labour Standards–A
Preliminary Look at the Problem*
by Alan Hyde**
The information and communications technologies that have annihilated space and time
and created a global labour market, have simultaneously helped publicize the appalling labour
standards in many developing countries, including, though by no means limited to, their sectors
producing goods for export to the developed world.    Suddenly, the world of transnational labour
standards, long the private preserve of specialists at organizations like the International Labour
Organization, has come under increased scrutiny, from demonstrators in the streets outside trade
negotiations to American presidential debates, which have lately included intense, if confusing,
discussions about labour standards in trade agreements.
The scholarly literature on transnational labour standards is still some way from shaping
these intense political controversies.  To be blunt, it is remarkable how little is known in an
academic sense about transnational labour standards.   We know very little about when such
standards will be promulgated and less still about their systematic effects.  In this near-vacuum, it
is hard to argue effectively for the rejection of any of the common political positions, such as
either the naive proliferation of labour standards (four hundred conventions of the International
Labour Organization, on this way of thinking, being self-evidently twice as good as two hundred)
or their total rejection as impediments to trade or development. 
The most significant gap in the literature is the lack of systematic knowledge about the
real-world impact of existing labour standards.  Our ignorance here is close to total.  It is difficult
to find a single case, no matter how publicized, in which one can be confident that attempts to
enforce transnational labour standards have in fact improved working conditions.  Everybody
knows that the American television performer Kathie Lee Gifford cried on television when
confronted with working conditions at the factories in Honduras producing clothing sold under
her name, but few know much about whether this resulted in any improvements there.  
Everybody knows that pressure was placed on manufacturers of soccer balls in Sialkot, Pakistan,
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UNICEF, ILO, Declare Soccer Ball Industry Child Labor Free, The Pakistani Newswire,1
April 27, 2002 (available on LEXIS News Database).
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor, Child Labor in the Soccer Ball2
Industry: A Report on the Continued Use of Child Labor in the Soccer Ball Industry in Pakistan
(1999), www.laborrights.org/projects/foulball/index.html ; Kimberly Ann Elliott & Richard B.
Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under Globalization? 114-15 (Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics, June 2003).
Günseli Berik, What Happened after Pakistan’s Soccer Ball Industry Went Child Free,3
Conference on Child Labor, Graduate School of Social Work, University of Utah, May 7-8,
2001.
Sources cited n.2.4
“It is commonly the case in Sialkot [Pakistan] for women and their children to stitch5
soccer balls in between other household chores.  In order to prevent families from putting their
children to work stitching soccer balls, work has been moved from homes to sewing centers. 
However, as has been noted in a previous section, mothers who work outside of the home place
their daughters at risk for fulltime home-work.  However, when mothers work in a household
enterprise, such as soccer ball stitching, daughters can more readily combine home-work with
schooling.  As a consequence, this program [Partners’ Agreement to Eliminate Child Labor in the
Soccer Ball Industry in Sialkot, Pakistan] has the potential to undermine the efforts that Pakistani
families are making to educate their daughters.”  Drusilla F. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and
Robert M. Stern, Child Labor: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, in International Labor Standards:
History, Theory, and Policy Options 195-247 (Kaushik Basu, Henrik Horn, Lisa Román, &
Judith Shapiro eds. 2003)(Malden, MA: Blackwell)[hereafter International Labor Standards], at
232-33.
Working in other industries: Violation of Labour Rules in Sialkot District, The Pakistani6
Newswire, March 3, 2002 (available on LEXIS News Database); U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
Pakistan-2001, Sec. 6d (March 2002), www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/sa/8237.htm .  On
child prostitution, I have seen references to a report that I have not been able to find on line or in
any library and suspect has been suppressed:  ILO-IPEC and National Commission for Child
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to end child labour, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the International
Labour Organization (ILO) have now declared the industry to be free of child labour .   One may,1
however, read directly conflicting reports as to whether production shifted to Pakistani stitching
centers monitored to make sure no children were sewing,  or instead to India under even lower2
working standards;  whether the displaced children ended up in school,  or deprived of home3 4
schooling , or working in nonexport industries with even lower labour standards, perhaps even as5
child prostitutes.   The impact of other initiatives to raise labour standards, such as conditioning6
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Welfare and Development (Pakistan), Combating Child Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation and
Involvement of Children in Intolerable Forms of Child Labor: Pakistan country report (1998). 
However, see also United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,
Sexually Abused and Sexually Exploited Children and Youth in Pakistan: A qualitative account
of their health needs and available services in selected provinces (2001),
www.unescap.org/esid/hds/sae/pakistan.pdf .
“To make conversation at a dinner party at the World Economic Forum in Davos, I once
asked the then-finance minister of Pakistan whether child labour was a problem in his country. 
Perhaps thinking I was a potential investor, he replied, ‘No, child labour is not a problem.  You
can hire all the children you want.’” Alan B. Krueger, The Political Economy of Child Labor, in
International Labor Standards, cited supra n.5, 248-55, at 248.
The US legislation is codified at 19 U.S.C. §2461 et seq., the requirement that7
beneficiaries observe labour rights is at 19 U.S.C. §2462(b)(2)(G) and (H).  See generally Lance
Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-Year
Review, 22 Comp.Lab.L. & Policy J. No.2/3 (2003).  Similar GSP programs are found in other
developed countries.
 See, e.g., Henry J. Frundt, Trade Conditions and Labor Rights: U.S. Initiatives,8
Dominican and Central American Responses (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida
1998)(attributing effectiveness to U.S. threats to suspend GSP benefits, particularly to the
Dominican Republic).
See, e.g., David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The New9
Economics of the Minimum Wage (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995); Truman F.
Bewley, Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1999).
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trade preferences in the Generalized System of Preferences program on particular labor standards
in the exporting country,  is similarly known entirely through anecdote.   The lack of systematic7 8
empirical research into the impact of transnational labour standards casts its shadow over the
entire field.  Economic analyses, definitely including this Chapter, revert to modeling standards
in ideal labour markets, when the one thing we know about labour regulation is that it often has
different real-world consequences than would be predicted by economic theory that assumes
classical labour markets.9
Despite this major empirical uncertainty, legal scholars who examine transnational labour
standards typically focus on three major features of the current legal regime that seem anomalous
or puzzling from a legal point of view.   First, the multiplicity of norms; in particular, the contrast
between multilateral and bilateral norms .  Second, particularly in the United States, the choice
among international, transnational, or distinctly American standards (whether created specially
for foreign workplaces, or the same standards applied at home).  Third, the ineffectiveness,
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For some free-traders like Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade Today 95 (2002)(Princeton:11
Princeton University Press) any smaller trading pact, such as NAFTA, necessarily detracts from
the free trade system (NAFTA “a pox on the world trading system”).
Civil Rights Act of 1991, §109, amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701(f) and12
702(c), 42 U.S.C. §§2000e(f) and 2000e-1(c), and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
§102(c), 42 U.S.C. §12112(c).  For a remarkable application, see Kang v. U.Lim America, Inc.,
296 F.3d 810 (9  Cir. 2002), where the court applied the Civil Rights Act to a Californiath
corporation without facilities and too small to be covered by the Act, by combining it with a
maquiladora electronics factory that it owned in Tijuana, Mexico.  This permitted a claim by an
executive of Korean origin, now an American citizen, working at the Tijuana plant.  The court
explained that the statutory reference to U.S. citizens did not mean that the legislation was
restricted only to such U.S. citizens.   It is not easy to explain how a Mexican citizen, working in
Mexico for a plant owned by a U.S. employer, can be a statutory employee under the U.S. Civil
Rights Act  for purposes of counting employees, but not for purposes of complaining about
discrimination.
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 sets out “trade negotiating13
objectives” for the United States, as part of setting up a system limiting Congress’s ability to
revise trade agreements, once negotiated.  Among these objectives are “to promote respect for
worker rights and the rights of children consistent with the core labor standards of the ILO (as
defined in section 2113(6), 19 USC §3813(6) and an understanding of the relationship between
trade and worker rights,” §2102(a)(6), 19 USC §3802(a)(6); “to seek provisions in trade
agreements under which parties to those agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or
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approaching absence, of current sanctions.  I shall refer to these three questions as the “legal
scholar’s questions.”  Let me explain these further.
First, a complete picture of transnational labour standards includes a bewildering array of
public and private law.  In no particular order, one encounters genuinely international standards,
typically promulgated as conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) but possibly
also including provisions of international covenants such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  There are
also labour rights provisions in formal treaties, such as the North American Agreement on
Labour Cooperation  (the so-called “side agreement” to the North American Free Trade10
Agreement), that are transnational but not international, and thus unsatisfactory to many people
for that very reason.   Some labour standards are found in domestic legislation.   In the U.S.,11
such domestic legislation includes very different models of regulation.  The Civil Rights Act
applies to the foreign operations of American firms, but in terms only to the American citizens
employed there.   U.S. trade laws now require all trade agreements to require labour standards in12
the main text.    As mentioned, some trade benefits are conditioned on recipients’ observance of13
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art11
reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encouragement
for trade,” §2102(a)(7), 19 USC §3802(a)(7); “to promote universal ratification and full
compliance with ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor,” §2102(a)(9), 19 USC §3802(a)(9); “to
ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail to effectively enforce
its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction,”
§2102(b)(11)(A), 19 USC §3802(b)(11)(A).  While the legal status of these objectives is not
clear, U.S. trade negotiators have chosen to treat them as binding, see Kimberly Ann Elliott,
Labor Standards and the Free Trade Area of the Americas 14-17, Institute for International
Economics Working Paper 03-7 (August 2003),
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/2003/03-7.pdf .
supra n.7.14
While the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 includes respect for ILO15
core labor standards as a trade negotiating objective of the U.S., supra n.13, it includes an
idiosyncratic definition of those standards that omits their ban on discrimination.  Section
2113(6), 19 USC §3813(6).
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350; Doe v. Unocal, 2002 U.S.App.LEXIS 19263 (916 th
Cir. 2002)(Unocal violated law of nations in participating in pipeline project staffed with forced
labor recruited under military compulsion), vacated for rehearing en banc, 2003 U.S.App.LEXIS
2716 (9  Cir., Feb. 14, 2003), argued and submitted June 13, 2003.   Unocal has since settled thisth
case.  Unocal Settles Rights Suits in Myanmar, New York Times, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6, col.4.
The case thus suggests, but is not precedent for, the proposition that a private actor may violate
the law of nations for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute.  Now see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124
S.Ct. 2739, 2761-62, 159 L.Ed.2d 718, 749 (2004)(suggesting “law of nations” enforceable under
this statute must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized”, namely, mercantile questions, law merchant, violation of safe conduct, infringement
of rights of ambassadors, and antipiracy).
Martinez v. Dow Chemical Co., 219 F.Supp.2d 719 (E.D. La. 2002), rejecting numerous17
motions to dismiss.  The suits on behalf of classes of overseas banana workers are currently
being remanded to state courts, following the destruction in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538
5
labour standards.   However, in both cases, the specified labour standards are similar, but not14
identical to, the ILO’s truly international standards.  The Alien Tort Statute may require U.S.15
corporations to respect, in their overseas operations, those international human rights that have
become part of the “law of nations,” and these international human rights might include some
ILO standards.   U.S. corporations may also be liable for failing to observe basic health and16
safety norms of unclear provenance, violated when pesticides banned for domestic use are used
in their overseas operations.   Finally, labour standards are found in purely private compacts and17
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U.S. 468  (2003), of the devices that had been used to create federal jurisdiction .
See generally Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental18
Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring,
http://web.mit.edu/dorourke/www/PDF/OutsourcingReg.pdf ; Ingeborg Wick, Workers' tool or
PR ploy?: A guide to codes of international labor practice, http://www.suedwind-
institut.de/Workers-tool-2003.pdf .
Harry Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate19
Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation, in Labour Law in an Era of
Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities 471-87 (Joanne Conaghan, Richard
Michael Fischl, & Karl Klare ed. 2002)(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
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commitments of the corporations themselves.   To the legal scholar, this multiplicity of18
lawmaking authority normally appears as a weakness of transnational labour standards.  We lack
any model that would explain why this multiplicity might be functional, so it naturally appears as
something that could be exploited by corporations seeking the lightest form of regulation.19
Second, in the U.S., this regulatory redundancy creates painful choices for advocates for
workers in developing countries, from the public interest lawyers at the International Labor
Rights Fund, to the personal injury lawyers who sued the banana growers hoping to do well by
doing good.  Bluntly, the efficacy of the law seems inversely related to its international character. 
 The developments summarized at notes 12-17 represent a new aggressive unilateralism by
American courts, applying American law to the overseas operations of American firms, with
little or no reference to any international standards.   Advocates may thus choose law applied by
U.S. courts, with U.S. procedure and real monetary remedies (tort law in the banana worker
cases; Alien Tort Statute; Civil Rights Act in Kang).   It is hard to explain why they should
instead explore transnational regimes with vaguer remedies (NAALC); or international standards
with no remedies at all (ILO Conventions, UN Covenants).  Advocates may hardly be criticized
for selecting strategies with remedies.  Academics and others who favor genuinely transnational
standards are hard-pressed to explain exactly why internationalism is important, in the teeth of
this recent American unilateralism.
Third, the vagueness or absence of remedies for many regimes of labour regulation
naturally make them seem precious and artificial, and limit their interest to many legal scholars
and advocates.  People who think that standards without sanctions might nevertheless be worth
fighting for have not advanced any theory explaining why this might be so.
The thesis of this Chapter is that these three questions–regulatory multiplicity, the value
of internationalism, and sanctions-- are related, and answered by the same model.   I shall argue
that transnational labour standards (of all types) arise to solve coordination problems in which
countries would gain by cooperation but will be disadvantaged if their trading rivals defect.  As
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art11
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’Origine et les Fondements de l’Inégalité,20
Seconde Partie, 3 Oeuvres Complètes 166-67 (Jean Starobinski ed., Pléiade ed. 1964)[1755](all
7
such, transnational labour standards fall into a class of strategic problems extensively studied,
and formalized, by game theorists.  Understanding the strategic aspects of regulating labour
standards will help explain why there are multiple sources of legal standards; why international
standards are necessary but insufficient; why negotiated bilateral standards are also necessary but
insufficient; and how standards without immediate sanctions can build the trust that permit
countries to maintain standards that benefit them all.  On this view, it also follows that some
transnational labour standards enhance efficiency and are fully compatible with comparative
advantage, as they will be adopted only when in the interest of the affected country.
These are large claims.  I advance them in the spirit of provoking and enriching our
mutual inquiries.  Ultimately, the test of any legal standard is its impact in the observable world. 
As we have already observed, our empirical knowledge about the impact of labour standards is
particularly weak.  However, I hope that the model proposed here will sharpen and guide the
search for such understanding.
Part I of this Chapter models transnational labour standards as solutions to coordination
games, specifically, the game called “Stag Hunt.”  Part II reviews the behavioural literature on
the actual play of Stag Hunt games in laboratory settings and shows how well it predicts some
version of our existing regulatory regime.  Part III applies the model to specific regulatory
standards, showing how understanding their strategic function explains the level of regulation
and the presence or absence of sanctions.
I.  The Value of Cooperation: Transnational Labour Regulation as a Stag Hunt
A. Stag Hunts
A Stag Hunt is a game in which players can gain by cooperating, but only if everyone else
does.  If the other player is selfish, the first player is also better off selfish.  The game takes its
name from a brief observation in Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality.  Rousseau describes the
beginnings of morality in societies of hunters.  The entire passage reads: 
Voilà comment les hommes purent insensiblement acquerir quelque idée grossiére
des engagements mutuels et de l’avantage de les remplir, mais seulement autant
que pouvoit l’exiger l’intérêt présent et sensible; car la prévoyance n’étoit rien
pour eux, et loin de s’occuper d’un avenir éloigné, ils ne songeoient pas même au
lendemain.  S’agissoit il de prendre un Cerf, chacun sentoit bien qu’il devoit pour
cela garder fidellement son poste; mais si un liévre venoit à passer à la portée de
l’un d’eux, il ne faut pas douter qu’il ne le poursuivit sans scrupule, et qu’ayant
atteint sa proye il ne se souciât fort peu de faire manquer la leur à ses
Compagnons.20
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spelling and punctuation as in original).  The English translations that I consulted all have basic
grammatical errors or sound stilted because of reliance on cognates, so with some hesitation I
will offer my own translation: 
That is how men could imperceptibly acquire some rough idea of mutual obligations, and
of the advantages of keeping them, but only insofar as present and perceptible interest might
require; for foresight meant nothing to them, and, far from concerning themselves with the
remote future, they did not even think about the next day.  In hunting a stag, each knew well that
for this purpose he had to maintain faithfully his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach
of one of them, no one can doubt that he would pursue it without scruple, and having attained his
prey he cared little about having made his companions lose theirs.
The amenability of this passage for analysis as a formal game was apparently first noticed 
independently by Amartya Sen, Isolation, Assurance, and the Social Rate of Discount, 81(1)
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112-24 (1967), and  David K. Lewis, Convention: A
Philosophical Study 7 (1969)(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.Pr.).   Of course, game theorists do
not treat the Stag Hunt as a primitive stage in moral development but rather as a dilemma that
might arise in any situation involving gains from cooperation.   Interestingly, recent primate
research suggests that Rousseau was indeed correct to locate the origins of morality in hunting
bands, though the account might apply to species other than human.  Sarah F. Brosnan and Frans
B.M. De Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 435 Nature 297-99 (18 September 2003)(capuchin
monkeys, who cooperate in hunting, will reject the cucumber that they otherwise regard as fair
payment for a pebble if they witness another monkey receiving a grape for the same pebble).
As a native of Los Angeles and current resident of New York City, I take on faith all21
assumptions about hunting.
The mnemonic for this is Roman Catholic.22
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The point is that stag makes a much better dinner than hare but can only be hunted in a group in
which everyone cooperates, while hare may be hunted individually.   If you think that everyone21
will cooperate, you are better off hunting stag.  But if you expect that even one person will go off
to hunt hare, then you had better hunt hare yourself.
In formal game theory terms, with two players, Row player and Column player, and
payoffs indicated, as is customary (Row, Column):22
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Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, & Piero Tani, Introduction, in Frontiers of Game Theory23
18 (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1993).  Other general introductions to Stag Hunts are Douglas G.
Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 35-39 (Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press 1994); Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in
Strategic Interaction 375-95 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton: Princeton
University Press 2003); Brian Skyrms, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
(Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press 2004).  Stag Hunts are also sometimes called
“coordination games” or “weak link” games (since if one player, the “weak link,” defects, the
others will drop to his level); Amartya Sen calls them “assurance games”, Sen, supra n 20.    I
have found two valuable applications of Stag Hunt models to problems in international law or
diplomacy.  Carlo Carraro, Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European
Monetary Coordination, 24 Empirica 163-77 (1997)(examining monetary policy decision in four
European countries over a decade and finding them best represented as a stag hunt game); 
Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A
Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 Yale J. Int’l. Law 79-139
(1998)(analyzing tax treaties, which typically lack enforcement provisions, as solutions to Stag
Hunts, and suggesting they work better than legalistic approach associated with trade law).
9
Column Player
hunts stag (cooperates) hunts hare (defects)
Row player
hunts stag 2,2 0,1
hunts hare 1,0 1,1
That is, if both players hunt stag they will both get a payoff of 2 for the stag.  If either
defects to hunt a hare, he will get 1 for the hare and his companion will get nothing.  If both
know or decide that it is hare that shall be hunted, each will catch a hare for a payoff of 1.
A helpful formal feature of this game is that it may be extended to n-number of players. 
The selfish strategy (hunting hare) yields a fixed payoff no matter what the other players choose
(anyone can catch a hare, apparently), while a cooperative strategy yields increasing payoffs
depending on the number of players (the more hunters, the bigger the big game that may be
landed).  
For simplicity, return to the payoff matrix involving two players.  This game has two
Nash equilibria: either everyone hunts stag, or everyone hunts hare.  Hunting stag is “payoff
dominant” (or Pareto optimal) but risky since one can easily be left with nothing.  Hunting hare is
“risk dominant”, “secure”, or “maximin,” since it has the highest guaranteed payoff.   Thus there23
is one Nash equilibrium (each hunts hare) that is not Pareto optimal.  There is no strategy that is
dominant in the sense of being the best regardless of what others do.  The best strategy depends
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Camerer, supra n. 23, at 377.24
Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common25
Knowledge 11-12 (2001)(Princeton: Princeton University Press).
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directly on what others do, specifically, whether they will cooperate or not.  The n-player Stag
Hunt is similar, except that it has a n number of Nash equilibria, each short of the Pareto-optimal
solution in which everyone cooperates to hunt stag.
The Stag Hunt is easily confused with the more familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which
players similarly weigh the returns from decisions to cooperate or defect, depending on what a
partner does.    In fact, in behavioural experiments, subjects often turn Prisoner’s Dilemmas into
Stag Hunts, cooperating until the partner defects.   24
However, in strict modeling, the games are different.  In the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the highest payoff that a player can receive comes not through cooperation but through being the
lucky one who rats on a confederate and is thus rewarded by the prosecutors with a lighter or no
sentence.  If both prisoners remain silent, they will be convicted of some lesser charge.  If both
rat, they will be convicted of the main charge.  If only one rats he will be set free and his
confederate will serve a long sentence.  These payoffs might be represented with years of prison,
minuses in front to show that the longer term is the worse payoff:
Column player
stays silent (cooperates) rats (defects)
Row player
stays silent -3, -3 -10, 0
rats 0, -10 -6, -6
In such a Prisoner’s Dilemma, people can always do better by being selfish, whatever the other
does.  They prefer mutual cooperation to mutual noncooperation.  That is, mutual cooperation
achieves the highest social product (here, -3 + -3).  But they cannot achieve it, because each
player always rationally will select noncooperation.  Noncooperation (ratting) always gives the
higher payoff, whatever the partner chooses.
Free rider problems are Prisoner’s Dilemmas in this sense.  “‘Solving’ free rider problems
[like other Prisoner’s Dilemmas] hence requires enlarging people’s possible motivations, by for
example legal or social sanctions against free riders or repeated contexts in which free riding now
might make people not cooperate with you later.  ‘Solving’ coordination problems [like Stag
Hunts], however, does not require changing people’s motivations: when everyone cooperates,
each person wants to do so because everyone else is.”   In a Stag Hunt or coordination or25
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This is just a formal requirement of the game.  If the leaders have no long-term gains26
from cooperation, it is not a Stag Hunt.  Examples might be kleptocracies that survive by
skimming off from current unregulated foreign investment and would lose if any of that
investment is lost, Daniel Haile, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, & Harrie A.A. Verbon, Self-Serving
Dictators and Economic Growth, Center for Economic Studies and IFO Institute of Economic
Research Working Paper 1105, www.CESifo.de (December2003); or countries with extremely
low time horizons, where the population would die of famine in the time interval between
passing up the available hare and the cooperative bringing down of a stag.  In such situations,
there are no net gains from cooperation and the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma or something else. 
The assumption of this Chapter, however, is that such situations without gains from cooperation
are atypical, and that we may helpfully approach the problem of transnational labour standards as
a problem in the institutional arrangements that might help countries achieve gains from
cooperation.  Ultimately, however, the question of which describes reality is an empirical
question.
I hope in future work to specify more precisely the payoffs from cooperating on high27
labour standards and from deviating for short-term advantage.  For present purposes, the payoffs
will be crude and ad hoc. However, the crude ad hoc payoffs assumed in this Chapter are in fact
compatible with the limited empirical literature on the economic effects of labour standards,
specifically including the contributions to this Symposium by Brian Langille and Kevin Banks. 
That is, Brian Langille is quite correct that there is no general “race to the bottom.”  That is,
flows of trade and investment do not create inexorable pressure on each country to lower its
labour standards so as to attain comparative advantage.  My assumption here is that this race, if it
exists at all, is limited by each country’s self interest that places serious constraints on how much
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assurance game, unlike a Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperation is always rational–but only if
everyone else does.
B. Transnational Labour Regulation as a Stag Hunt
We model the adoption of transnational labour standards as solutions to Stag Hunts, in
which everyone is better off if all cooperate (hunt stag), but there is a risk that any individual
actor might pursue short-term advantage by defecting (hunting hare and leaving the others with
only the gains from hare hunting).  Actors are countries that choose whether or not to adopt and
enforce labour standards.  They are assumed to be rational in the sense of favoring Pareto-
optimal actions that improve living standards in their population at least where this can be
accomplished without taking away from any.26
 Consider the following highly-stylized statement of the problem.  It is clearly in the long-
term interest of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan that all their children go to school and not work
in factories.  Going to school builds human capital, attracts more and better foreign investment,
and generally results in a richer society for all.   However, if (contrary to fact) India and Pakistan 27
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it will reduce its labour standards in order to attract foreign direct investment.   Nevertheless,
Kevin Banks is also correct to observe that there may be advantages to a country in lowering its
standards, advantages that I model as short-term.
In fact, there is no evidence of any general “race to the bottom.”  Every study to examine
the question has failed to find an relationship between low labour standards and either foreign
direct investment or the competitiveness of exports.  See generally Theodore H. Moran, Beyond
Sweatshops: Foreign Direct Investment and Globalization in Developing Countries 79-83
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution)(2002); Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Trade, Employment, and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers’
Rights and International Trade (Paris: OECD)(1996)(no relationship between low labor
standards and any measure of export performance); OECD, International Trade and Core
Labour Standards, (Paris: OECD)(2000)(same); Mita Aggarwal, International Trade, Labor
Standards, and Labor Market Conditions: An Evaluation of the Linkages, U.S. International
Trade Commission, Office of Economics, Working Paper No. 95-06-C (June 1995)(almost half
of U.S. foreign direct investment is in Canada, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France
(at 11); little goes to countries that do not observe core labour standards); Drusilla K. Brown,
Alan V. Deardorff, & Robert M. Stern, The Effects of Multinational Production on Wages and
Working Conditions in Developing Countries, National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 9669 (April 2003)(multinational firms routinely provide higher wages and better working
conditions than their local counterparts and are typically not attracted preferentially to countries
with weak labour standards); Dani Rodrik, Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They
Matter and What Do We Do About Them?, in Robert Z. Lawrence, Dani Rodrik, and John
Whalley, Emerging Agenda for Global Trade: High Stakes for Developing Countries 35-79
(Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council)(1996)(no significant relationship between
trade flows and various measures of labour standards, unionization, or standards of political
democracy); Peter Morici with Evan Schulz, Labor Standards in the Global Trading System 48-
57 (Washington, DC: Economic Strategy Institute)(2001)(reviewing and correcting analysis in
Aggarwal and Rodrik studies, supra, and nevertheless concluding that “violations of workers’
rights do not positively affect aggregate investment,” at 57); Vivek H. Dehejia & Yiagadeesen
Samy, Trade and Labour Standards–Theory, New Empirical Evidence, and Policy Implications,
CESifo Working Paper No. 830 (December 2002)(long hours worked is negatively correlated
with export performance; unionization, civil liberties, and occupational injuries all lack
significant relation to export performance; “there is no robust evidence that countries with low
labour standards are attracting more [foreign direct investment] than those with high labour
standards”, at 27); Matthias Busse & Sebastian Braun, Export Structure, FDI and Child Labour,
Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA) Discussion Paper 216 (2003)(foreign direct
investment flows are negatively correlated with child labour, even among developing countries);
Mahmood Hussain & Keith E. Maskus, Child Labour Use and Economic Growth: An
Econometric Analysis, World Economy 26:993-1017 (July 2003)(countries with higher amounts
of child labour have lower amounts of human capital in the future).   The largest recipients of
foreign direct investment are (in order) Luxembourg, China, France, Germany, the United States,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  United Nations Commission on Trade and
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Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2003: Overview, Figure 2, at 4,
www.unctad.org/en/docs//wir2003overview_en.pdf.
Particular flows of foreign direct investment that are contingent on host countries’
lowering labour standards of course exist, but are more consistent with the Stag Hunt model
presented here (a hare, not particularly nutritious but passing within reach), than with any
supposed “race to the bottom.”   
A number of economists have noted in passing that labour standards might solve28
strategic interactions in which countries might get stuck in a low level Nash equilibrium, e.g.
Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International
Labor Standards, 37 Journal of Economic Literature 1083-1119, at 1107 (1999), but I have
located no formal models.  
John Stuart Mill, Employment of Children in Manufactories, in Newspaper Writings29
August 1831-October 1834, 23 Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 398-401 (Ann P. Robson &
John M. Robson eds. 1986) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)[1832], at 399.
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actually succeeded in getting all their children out of workshops and into schools, there are
certain specific foreign investments that would flow to Bangladesh to take advantage of its child
labour, and this would be true even if (as we suppose) Bangladesh knows that it is in its long-
term interest that children learn instead of work.  This is a classic Stag Hunt.  If all countries
cooperate in ending child labour, all will be better off.  Jobs will be taken by unemployed adults,
and children will go to school.  But if even one country defects by letting children work, it will
capture a certain stream of foreign direct investment that others will not.  So, if you think one of
your rivals will be selfish, it is rational for you to be selfish, too.  There are thus two Nash
equilibria: one that is Pareto optimal (no children work), the other that is Pareto suboptimal
(children work).
So stated, this is not exactly a new insight, nor one the acquisition of which requires
much formal game theory.   Child labour, noted John Stuart Mill in 1832, is a case “in which it28
would be highly for the advantage of every body, if every body were to act in a certain manner,
but in which it is not the interest of any individual to adopt the rule for the guidance of his own
conduct, unless he has some security that others will do so too.”   The value of turning toward29
game theory is the illumination that it offers, particularly in its behavioural version, to the legal
scholars’ questions of regulatory multiplicity, choosing between unilateral and multilateral
norms, and sanctions.
Just these legal scholars’ questions elude the many interesting attempts, by economists of
trade, to model trade agreements in similarly strategic terms.    There is a long tradition of
economic analysis of trade agreements, such as customs unions or agreements to reduce tariffs,
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The most recent is Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World30
Trading System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)(2002).   Earlier reviews include John McMillan,
Game Theory in International Economics (Chur: Harwood)(1986), and Avinash Dixit, Strategic
Aspects of Trade Policy, in Advances in Economic Theory Fifth World Congress 329-62
(Truman F. Bewley ed. 1987)(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
Sensing this problem, the authors of one game theory model of labour standards assume31
that, if one country defects by lowering labour standards, its partner will retaliate on some other
dimension of trade policy, such as by raising a tariff.  Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staier, The
Simple Economics of Labor Standards and the GATT, in Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade
Policies 195-231 (Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, eds. 2000)(Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press).  This assumes away what is precisely of interest to the legal scholar.  In the real
world, as everybody (including of course Bagwell and Staier) knows, parties to the GATT system
are not permitted to raise tariffs or otherwise retaliate because of partners’ low labour standards. 
That is what the fight has been about for years!  
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as formal cooperative solutions to similar strategic dilemmas.   To oversimplify, in these models30
trade between two countries can reach at least two equilibria, a low equilibrium in which they
may not trade at all (perhaps because of high tariffs), and a higher one marked by low tariffs and
more trade.  A formal trading agreement may assure the country that is lowering its tariff that its
partner will do the same.  In this analysis, however, agreements of this type are self-enforcing,
requiring no formal enforcement mechanism.  If one partner defects (by refusing to lower the
tariffs that it had promised to lower, for example), the other simply retaliates by refusing to lower
its tariffs.
While we will show that labour standards, like trade agreements, similarly enforce high-
equilibrium cooperative solutions to games with nonunique equilibria, we will not be able to
adopt these economic models of trade agreements.  In the world of labour standards, such self-
enforcement-through-retaliation is neither feasible nor desirable.   To return to our example, if
Bangladesh breaks a labour standards agreement by letting children work in factories, it
accomplishes nothing if India now lets children start working in its.31
Can countries cooperate to lift labour standards if there are short-term advantages in
defecting, and little effective sanction against defectors?  Game theory suggests at least three
possible areas of research: first, make the theory dynamic by repeating the game; second,
examine the behaviour of countries that adopt labour standards to see whether they are
compatible with the model; and third, examine behavioural experiments on how people actually
play these games.  (Again, I recognize there are many areas of research that lie outside game
theory, most important being the comparative empirical study of competing public and private
attempts to improve labour standards).  
First, the Stag Hunt game of labour standards that we have developed so far, like
Rousseau’s original, is a static game.  A hunter chases hare; the stag hunt aborts; one hunter eats
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art11
A standard reference is Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory 150-6032
(1991)(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).   I will not be pursuing the literature on repeated games in
this Chapter.
See also Carraro, supra n.23.33
Nancy H. Chau & Ravi Kanbur, The Adoption of Labour Standards Conventions: Who,34
When, and Why?  Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 2904 (August 2001),
www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP2904.asp .  Chau and Kanbur do not specifically model the adoption
of labour standards as a Stag Hunt, or any other formal game.  However, their findings are a kind
of real-world experiment that, like some models, shows the importance of peer groups or location
in realizing cooperation.  It is both theoretically and empirically much more likely that
cooperative solutions will obtain in large groups if players bargain with neighbours and imitate
their successes.  Jason McKenzie Alexander & Brian Skyrms, Bargaining With Neighbors: Is
Justice Contagious?, 96 J.Phil. 588-98 (1999); Skyrms, supra n.23, passim and at 23-29.  We will
return to this point.  
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hare; everyone else is hungry.  Rousseau does not explain why the other hunters will tolerate this
situation or what, if anything, they might do to enforce the joint project.
A closer approximation to reality is to play the game over and over again, to see whether
those with a taste for stag can develop ways of keeping the hare hunters’ mind on stag hunting.  
The theory of repeated games is complex and beautiful, and revolves around a so-called Folk
Theorem that states that any Pareto-optimal outcome can be maintained as a Nash-equilibrium if
the game is repeated.     The implications for transnational labour standards are obvious.32
However, for present purposes I will not develop my argument with reference to the theory of
repeated games.
The second strategy is to examine the behaviour of countries that adopt or ratify
transnational labour standards, to see whether this behaviour is consistent with the model that
treats such actions as cooperative attempts to realize gains from cooperation and prevent
defection to secure short-term advantage.    Nancy H. Chau and Ravi Kanbur have examined33
just this relationship, by studying the time patterns of ratification of four recent ILO conventions
dealing with core labour rights.  They found that the crucial variable was indeed peer effects. 
Countries ratify agreements that their peer group has ratified.  Peer group, in turn, is defined by
countries’ export orientation, level of development, and geographic region.  There is also some
influence on ratification behaviour of the origin of each country’s legal system.  However,
economic and other political variables do not explain propensity to ratify ILO conventions.34
The third strategy to examine behavioural experiments in Stag Hunt games.  This has not
previously been done in discussions of transnational law.  We shall see that observable attempts
to create and sustain cooperative behaviour tell us a great deal about the structure of transnational
labour standards.
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Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and35
Reputation, in Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research 19-
79, at 20 (Elinor Ostrom and James Walker eds. 2003)(NY: Russell Sage).
Ostrom, supra n. 35, at 23-24.  (“Social-dilemma situation” is Ostrom’s general term for36
situations in which rational participants making  individual choices will not reach Pareto-optimal
outcomes).  She cites Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games
with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54(3) Econometrica 533-54 (1986).
John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, & Richard O. Beil, Tacit Coordination37
Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure, 80(1) Amer.Econ.Rev. 234-48 at 244-46
(1990); Marc J. Knez & Colin F. Camerer, Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemmas by
Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games, 82(2) Organizational Behav. &
Hum. Dec. Processes 194-216 (2000).  The ability of two (but no more) players to reach the
Pareto-optimal strategy is demonstrated theoretically in Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme,
Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games, in Frontiers of Game Theory 237-53 (Ken Binmore,
Alan Kirman, & Piero Tani eds. 1993)(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
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II.  Experimental Stag Hunt Games
I have been complaining of the paucity of attempts to accommodate theoretically the
range of attempts to regulate labour standards.   The same complaint has been made about game
theory experiments.   Certainly our knowledge of cooperative behaviour in games is not35
adequate to design a system of transnational labour standards from the ground up.  However, the
behavioural literature on games is quite illuminating on the three legal scholars’ problems:
understanding regulatory redundancy (that is, comparing norms that bind two parties with those
that bind n parties); understanding unilaterally-imposed norms; and sanctions.
The most basic point is the most transcendentally hopeful.  “It is now theoretically well
established that when individuals, modeled as freely rational actors with low discount rates,
interact in an indefinitely repeated social-dilemma situation, it is possible for them to achieve
optimal or near optimal outcomes and avoid the predicted strategies of one-shot and finitely
repeated games that yield suboptimal outcomes.”   We must not lose sight of this insight. 36
Countries need not be stuck forever in a low-level equilibrium.   If decent working conditions are
in their long-term interest, there will be a way of assuring that all will move together to the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium, even if (as is surely true) it is difficult to know just how to do this.
Second, in experimental stag hunt games, pairs of players nearly always coordinate on the
highest payoff.37
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Van Huyck et al, supra n.37.38
Marc J. Knez & Colin F. Camerer, Creating Expectational Assets in the Laboratory:39
Coordination in Weakest-Link Games, 15 Strategic Mgt. J. 101-19 (1994).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.Pa.L.Rev. 202140
(1996).
Roberto Weber, Colin Camerer, Yuval Rottenstreich, & Marc Knez, The Illusion of41
Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games, 12(5) Organizational Science 582-
98 (2001).  A contrary finding may be Iris Bohnet & Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing
or Equilibrium Selection?, UC Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 138
(2003), in which subjects in a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria were induced to
jump from a low-payoff equilibrium to a high-payoff equilibrium on being told that the low-
payoff equilibrium was a “penalty.”  Perhaps transnational labour standards might have similar
effect.
Sources cited supra n.34.42
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Third, coordination on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium has never been observed
experimentally in large groups.  In groups with 14 to 16 participants, after three rounds of play all
sessions converged on the lowest possible choice.   Even groups as small as 6 routinely38
converge on the least efficient outcome.39
This might seem to create a role for formal legal standards.  Legal scholars who write
about game theory love to assert that the communication of a formal legal standard in such a
situation will provide a coordination point around which parties will converge.   Unfortunately,40
there is no experimental support for this in the literature on Stag Hunts.  When leaders are
introduced into experimental games to urge parties to adopt the Pareto-optimal position, they are
largely ineffective in changing payoffs.  Pairs still find the optimal solution, and large groups (in
this experiment, groups of 9 or 10) do not.  (However, participants inaccurately attribute effects
to the leaders.  The pairs inaccurately attribute their success to good leadership, while the large
groups inaccurately blame their failure on poor leadership).41
A more promising vehicle for enabling large groups to move to Pareto-optimal
cooperative solutions is the model mentioned supra n.34 and explored in Brian Skyrms’ new
book.  Small subgroups of “neighbours” converge on Pareto-optimal solutions, and then, as each
bargains with other neighbours, justice is “contagious.”   I shall explore the implications of this42
model for transnational labour standards.  So far as I know, however, there is no experimental
support for the spreading of “justice” in just this way.
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III. Working Hypotheses and Tentative Conclusions
A. Working Hypotheses
Applied to the problem of transnational labour standards, the experimental literature
suggests the following working hypotheses:
1. The project of transnational labour standards is neither foolish nor hopeless.  High standards
can be associated with strategies of high labour productivity and do not, in general, deter trade or
foreign investment.
2. Nations of the world will not, however, necessarily converge on high labour standards
naturally.  It is possible to become stuck at a low level equilibrium in which it is not in the
interest of any one country to improve its standards unless others do, too.
3. The most important factor in any country’s improving its labour standards is the “assurance”
(in Amartya Sen’s word) that its trading rivals will do the same.
4. It is far more likely that such trust and assurance will be achieved in groups of two than in
groups of six or more.   Consequently, labour standards provisions in negotiated trade
agreements (such as the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, or bilateral trade
agreements between two countries) perform an important function and do not detract from true
international standards (such as ILO conventions).  In other works, multiplicity of regulatory
institutions may well be functional and does not necessarily denote a weak or ineffective system.
5. International standards (such as ILO conventions) will probably not be effective in overcoming
a low-level equilibrium and moving large groups of countries to a higher-level equilibrium.  
However, the process of defining such standards may play a role in building trust.  For example,
they may provide means of showing trading rivals that one is genuinely committed to lifting
labour standards, or means of resisting domestic political pressures to lower standards.  They
may also provide coordination points that will influence bilateral and other negotiations among
smaller groups.
6. Game theory models of labour standards cannot definitively answer the question of the need
for sanctions.  Since a high-equilibrium state in which all countries lift labour standards is itself
Pareto-optimal, sanctions are not necessary to prevent defection.  (By contrast, in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma, players can always gain by defecting, and sanctions, or other tools for reordering
incentives, are necessary).   On the other hand, the chief obstacle to the growth of labour
standards is low trust, or lack of assurance that others won’t defect to pursue short-term
advantage, as may happen if defectors themselves do not trust the group.  Sanctions against
defection thus may be part of a strategy of moving to a higher equilibrium, so long as they do not
destroy the trust and assurance that ultimately must underlie transnational labour standards.  
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Drusilla K. Brown, A Transaction Cost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor43
Standards, in Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policies 246-64 (Alan V. Deardorff and Robert
M. Stern eds. 2000)(Ann Arbor: U.Mich. Pr.)(“Historically, the most effective strategies for
reducing child labor have been the byproduct of economic growth,” at 247); Avinash K. Dixit,
Comment, in Id. at 267-70 (U.S. began to get rid of child labor when real GNP per capita reached
$7000 in current dollars).  Eric Edmonds and Nina Pavcnik,  Does Globalization Increase Child
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This is an extraordinarily difficult problem in modeling to which I will have to return in
subsequent work.  However, some aspects are clear.  Transnational labour standards that are
unilaterally imposed by one country, as the U.S. does in its GSP program, other trade legislation,
banana worker litigation, and Alien Tort Claims Act, run a risk of creating justified anxiety that
the U.S. will not abide by true international standards and thus that other countries would be
foolish to do so.  Second, it is clear that agreements on labour standards will never be self-
enforcing in the manner of tariff agreements or customs unions.  To threaten a trading rival that,
should it lower its labour standards, you will lower yours, is neither efficacious nor attractive.
B. Tentative Conclusions on Legal Issues
However tentative, these working hypotheses suggest answers to the three questions
about transnational labour standards that we have been calling the legal scholar’s: regulatory
redundancy; the role of unilateralism; and the problem of sanctions.
1. Regulatory redundancy
Regulatory redundancy, at least between truly international standards (like ILO
Conventions) and standards in treaties (such as NAFTA or bilateral trade agreements), now
appears functional.   The standards in the bilateral and small-group treaties can create the
assurance that trading partners will also raise labour standards, assurance that will move all
parties from a suboptimal Nash equilibrium to a Pareto-optimal cooperative solution.  The
experimental literature suggests that such small groups can achieve such solutions.  The
international standards will not by themselves create such assurance, but can provide
coordination points for the smaller-scale bargaining.
This emphasis on trust and assurance implies that transnational regulation may be more
effective by concentrating on issues that do not evoke national pride or tradition, and therefore
are better suited for building trust and assurance.  For example, the ILO might be much better off
adding a right to basic health and safety to its core labour values, and emphasizing it, if
necessary, perhaps even over such issues as child labour or antidiscrimination, important as those
are.  The latter are issues on which national variation is probably inevitable, because of differing
social and religious traditions.  It also appears that nearly all countries voluntarily end child
labour when annual family income exceeds US $7000 in current values, so ending child labour
really requires a commitment to general economic development as opposed to targeted
enforcement.43
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Labor? Evidence From Vietnam,   National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8760
(February 2002), confirm the decline in child labour following the removal of price controls on
rice, export of rice at world prices, and the resulting increase in income to farmers.   Brown and
her associates caution, however, that “the well-being of today’s children and perhaps even
economic growth itself may depend on getting children out of the labor force and into schools
today.”  Brown et al, cited supra n.5, at 218 (emphasis original).
Nancy H. Chau & Ravi Kanbur, supra n.34.44
See also Kaushik Basu, Globalization and Marginalization: A Re-examination of45
Development Policy, Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD)
Working Paper no. 026 (April 2003); Nancy H. Chau & Ravi Kanbur, The Race to the Bottom,
From the Bottom, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 2687 (Feb. 2001).
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By contrast, a proposed ILO effort on workplace toxins would have no conflict with
national or religious traditions.   Teams of technical experts might annually identify twenty or
thirty of the most dangerous work processes or toxins in use in the world.  This process would be
technical, nonpolitical, and draw on expertise.   Countries would then commit to the eradication
of processes and chemicals appearing on the annual list.   The ILO would provide technical
assistance in this process, for example by suggesting alternatives.   The ILO’s health and safety
standards could then become reference points for national legislation and negotiated treaties. 
The point is that such a calm, technical process would itself become the means of building trust
and respect for ILO standards that would carry over into more controversial efforts such as
initiatives against child labour or discrimination.
The model also implies that the real negotiations over labour standards for developing
countries should probably be among those countries themselves.  If powerful countries impose
labour standards on developing countries, these will probably reflect in many, though not all,
cases an agenda of protecting standards in the developed country.  This objection cannot be
raised when the developing countries themselves are encouraged to set the standards that
overcome collective action problems and punish defectors.  As we have seen, even when
standards are international, such as ILO conventions, peer group effects will play a large role in
determining which countries ratify them.44
Under the model presented here, transnational labour standards are basically pacts among
developing countries, or countries at similar levels of development and with similar export
orientation.   However, there is a mismatch between this feature of labour standards and the45
existing institutions for their promulgation.  The latter are either international institutions
dominated by the more powerful countries, or, worse yet, standards propounded unilaterally by
those countries, to which we now turn.
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supra nn. 13 and 15.46
19 U.S.C. §2462(b)(2)(G) & (H)(country not eligible for GSP treatment if : “(G) Such47
country has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to
workers in the country (including any designated zone in that country)” or “(H) Such country has
not implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.”). 
19 U.S.C. §2702(b)(7) (countries not eligible for favorable tariff treatment unless48
“taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights (as defined in section 507(4) of
the Trade Act of 1974 [19 USCS § 2467(4)]) to workers in the country (including any designated
zone in that country).”
19 U.S.C. §3703(a)(1)(F)(country eligible if it “has established, or is making continual49
progress toward establishing, protection of internationally recognized worker rights, including
the right of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use of
any form of forced or compulsory labor, a minimum age for the employment of children, and
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational
safety and health”.)
Cases cited supra n. 17.50
Cases cited supra n. 12.51
Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading Nations,52
in 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites to Free Trade? 9-40 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Robert Hudec eds. 1996)(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), at 33.
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2. Unilateralism
We can now say precisely what is potentially wrong with the unilateral imposition by a
country of its own standards for the transnational labour standards of its own corporations, as has
been true of the U.S. Congress in trade legislation such as the Trade Act of 2002 , the U.S.46
version of the Generalized System of Preferences , Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act ,47 48
and African Growth and Opportunity Act .  Such unilateralism has similarly characterized courts49
in the U.S. holding banana growers to domestic safety standards  or U.S employers to U.S.50
antidiscrimination laws.    As a mode of transnational labour regulation, such American51
unilateralism offers many attractive features to the advocate for workers abroad.  These cases
take place in U.S. courts, with efficient procedures for trying class actions and compensating
advocates.  The most ardent free-trader cannot object to them, for they do not destroy any
comparative advantage of Mexico or Honduras.  In fact, free-traders who oppose labour
standards, as restrictions on trade,  have instead advocated precisely the imposition by importing
nations of their own standards on the overseas operations of their own employers.   Objection to52
such unilateralism should be based on something more substantial than a taste for the global or a
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Under a recognized exception to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs,53
importing countries may create “Generalized Systems of Preference” under which imports from
developing countries may enter free of duties if the exporting country agrees to a list of
conditions.    The United States, European Union, Canada, and Australia all have such GSP
programs.  Importing countries have almost total discretion whether to create such a GSP
program and, if so, what conditions to place on it.  Heavy political interference has always
characterized the administration of the US GSP program generally, James M. DeVault, Political
Pressure and the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, 22 Eastern Econ. J.  35-46 (1996), and
the labor provisions added in 1984, see generally Lance Compa and Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor
Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 Comp.Lab.L.& Policy J.
No. 2/3 (2002).  India has invoked a Dispute Settlement Panel of the World Trade Organisation
to consider its allegations of discriminatory application of the European Union’s GSP program,
specifically its special benefits for fighting drug trafficking and its labour and environmental
standards.  As this Chapter is written, it has been reported that the Panel has upheld this
complaint in a ruling that is still interim and confidential.  WTO Panel Rules in India’s Favour
(World Trade Organisation Panel Dismisses EU’s GSP Scheme), India Business Insight, Sept. 7,
2003 (available in LEXIS News database).
Dan Danielsen & Karl Klare, Trade, Labor & Catfish: A Case Study, presented at54
INTELL 7, Kyoto, Japan, March 26-29, 2004.
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distaste for American unilateralism, however common and indeed defensible (indeed, shared by
this American author) are such attitudes.
We can now explain exactly what might be the cost of such unilateralism, by Americans
or others.  The game theory perspective of this Chapter suggests that the main obstacle to
countries’ lifting their own standards is the fear that their trading rivals will not, leaving them
with the sucker’s payoff (a hare).  Overcoming this fear does not require fundamental reordering
of motivation, but rather the building of the trust and assurance needed to overcome short-term
advantage (the hare within reach) in favor of longer-term cooperation (bringing down a stag).   
Unilateralism of the kind seen recently in America potentially destroys this trust and assurance,
for it graphically suggests that all countries would be wise to pursue their own labour standards
since everyone else, particularly the biggest player, is doing the same.  This has certainly been
true of the administration of Generalized Systems of Preference, not merely in theory but in
practice, and, apparently, in legal findings as well.   53
Dan Danielsen and Karl Klare have recently explored a recent example of US
unilateralism that seems to exemplify the costs of unilateralism.   US growers of commercial54
catfish have recently succeeded in obtaining anti-dumping tariffs against Vietnamese catfish
filets.  Since the tariffs are prohibitive, Vietnamese catfish is effectively barred from the US
market.  The successive finding by the US Department of Commerce and US International Trade
Commission, that Vietnam was “dumping” catfish, rested entirely on the finding that Vietnam is
a “nonmarket economy”.  This permitted the US authorities to ignore the inability of the US
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catfish producers to show that catfish in fact are sold for less in the US than in Vietnam.  This is
a unilateral imposition by the US of its own version of labour standards.  It plainly merely
protects a politically powerful domestic industry and will do nothing to raise labour standards in
Vietnam.  Such unilateral linking of trade benefits to labour or other standards potentially
accomplishes little for labour standards and seriously undermines transnational institutions and
multinational trust.  It is entirely different from a hypothetical proceeding in which the ILO, or
some other transnational authority, or, preferably, Vietnam’s peers, actually found Vietnam to be
out of compliance with core labour standards and permitted countries to invoke trade remedies. 
Under the model presented in this Chapter, it is possible to imagine how such targeted invocation
of trade remedies might induce Vietnam to permit free trade unions, or end some other specified
labour practice.  By contrast, the US approach is linked to no specific labour practice and
effectively punishes Vietnam for its entire economic system.  It will result in no change in
Vietnam and reinforces the perception that the US does not and will not play by the rules of free
trade that it imposes on others.
As with all other claims in this paper, this one, too, is ultimately empirical.  One would
need to study the relationship between unilateral imposition of standards and later ability to reach
cooperative solutions.
3. The Problem of Sanctions
While a game theory perspective may illuminate the problem of sanctions in transnational
labour regulation, it cannot answer this question without much more precise empirical
specification of the costs and benefits.  From a game theory perspective, we can certainly see a
case for, and a case against, tougher sanctions.  
The case for sanctions is that they can increase the assurance that other countries will
indeed comply with negotiated standards and thus increase voluntary compliance by all the
others.  The case against sanctions is that sanctions that are seen as harsh or arbitrary may destroy
the very trust and cooperation that is the only long-term hope for labour standards.  
The empirical and experimental literature on games does not answer this question.  In a
Prisoner’s Dilemma, optimal solutions can be achieved by cooperating until a partner defects and
then sanctioning him or her.   However, for reasons we have explored, transnational labour55
regulation is not a Prisoner’s Dilemma but a Stag Hunt, and there has been little experimental
inquiry into the role of sanctions in overcoming the low trust that often prevents large groups
from reaching Pareto-optimal cooperative solutions.  This is a question to which I hope to return
in future work.
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